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This article addresses tort legislation considered during the 1990
Session of the Virginia General Assembly. This article also reviews
significant cases involving torts and products liability decided from
January 1, 1989, through May 31, 1990, by the Supreme Court of
Virginia, The United States Supreme Court, and the federal courts
sitting in Virginia.
I. LEGISLATION
A. Exemptions and Immunities from Liability
The General Assembly passed several measures limiting the tort
liability of certain entities. In most cases, the legislation protects
"good samaritans" who give in tangible and intangible ways to per-
sons or organizations in need. Other exemptions and immunities
were created to protect special classes of persons or entities.
Food service establishments and restaurants who donate food to
any food bank determined to be a charity exempt from taxation
under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) "shall be exempt from civil liability
arising from any injury or death resulting from the nature, age,
condition, or packaging of the donated food."1 The provision does
not exempt the donor from liability for intentional acts or gross
negligence resulting in injury or death.2 In addition, the section
provides that "[nlothing contained herein shall limit liability on
the part of any donee nonprofit charitable or religious organization
which accepts items of food under this section."'3 Presumably, is-
sues relating to charitable immunity would arise if an action were
brought against a donee who accepted food under this code
section.4
Dispatchers who provide uncompensated services to licensed
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-418.1 (Cure. Supp. 1990); see also id. § 35.1-14.2 (Cum. Supp.
1990) (donations of food to charitable organizations).
2. Id. § 3.1-418.1.
3. Id.
4. See ReDavid Rack, The Doctrine of Charitable Immunity: Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 541 (1990) [hereinafter Charitable Immunity].
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public or nonprofit emergency service agencies, and licensed physi-
cians serving without compensation as medical directors for emer-
gency medical services, shall not be liable for civil damages "result-
ing from the rendering of emergency medical services in good faith
by the personnel of such licensed agency."' 5 These persons are not
exempt from liability arising from their own acts or omissions re-
sulting from their gross negligence or misconduct.
6
Sport shooting ranges are now protected from actions for nui-
sance relating to noise resulting from the operation of the range.
This exemption from liability applies only "if the range is in com-
pliance with all ordinances relating to noise in effect at the time
construction or operation of the range was approved [by the
locality]."8
Landowners who enter into agreements with the Commonwealth,
its agencies, or other local or regional authorities, regarding the use
of the landowners' property for public purposes, shall be held
harmless from all liability arising out of that public use.9 Signifi-
cantly, the governmental entity who enters such an agreement is
responsible for providing and paying the cost of all reasonable legal
services required by a landowner who may have a claim asserted
against him arising out of the public use of the land.10 This protec-
tion to the landowner cannot be waived by lease or otherwise."
Moreover, any person who brings an action against the Common-
wealth or its agencies, pursuant to this provision, is subject to the
Virginia Tort Claims Act requirements. 2 Counties, cities, towns,
and local or regional authorities are also immune from liability for
acts of simple negligence arising out of the public use of the
property.
13
5. VA. CODE ANN, § 8.01-225(B) (Cure. Supp. 1990). The revisions to this code section
follow a two-year study by the Joint Subcommittee Studying Emergency Medical Services.
See Digest of Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia at the 1990 Session, published by
the Virginia Code Commission and the Division of Legislative Services.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225(B).
7. Id. § 15.1-29.20 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 29.1-509 (Cum. Supp. 1990). The public purposes in this provision include hunt-
ing, boating, bicycle riding, sightseeing and "any other recreational use[s]." Id. § 29.1-
509(B), -509(C). However, this section does not limit the liability created when the land-
owner receives compensation for the use of the land. Id. § 29.1-509(D).
10. Id. § 29.1-509(E).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see generally id. §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.9 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1990)
(Virginia Tort Claims Act).
13. Id. § 29.1-509(E) (Cum. Supp. 1990). A county, city, or town is, of course, liable for
1990]
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Any person who reports or discloses information relating to test-
ing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), in compliance with
the Code of Virginia, shall be immune from civil liability for such
reporting or disclosure. 4 A person who, through gross negligence
or malicious intent, makes an unauthorized disclosure of such in-
formation, is subject to civil liability and criminal penalty.15 How-
ever, these provisions do not impose any duty upon the testing
person or entity to report or disclose information regarding HIV
tests. 16 Significantly, there does not appear to be any duty to re-
port test results to the subject of the test. 7
Tow truck operators who respond to police requests- to tow vehi-
cles are immune from civil liability only for the act of responding
to the call from police.' 8 The immunity provision does not protect
tow truck operators from "liability for negligence in the towing,
recovery, or storage carried out by the towing and recovery
operator."' 9
The 1990 Session of the General Assembly may be noted for the
legislation that it did not pass in the torts area. For example, the
General Assembly did not pass a proposed bill which would have
extended immunity to "volunteers, sponsors, and certain tax ex-
empt organizations involved in sports activities."20 Immunity
would have applied to uncompensated volunteers conducting non-
profit sports activities in the absence of "willful or malicious mis-
the gross or wanton negligence of any of its officers or agents in the maintenance or opera-
tion of recreational facilities. Id. § 15.1-291. In a 1990 amendment, the General Assembly
specifically included "skateboard facility" in the list of recreational facilities subject to the
immunity provision. See id. The supreme court recently decided that a bus, used by a
county recreation department to transport senior citizens on a shopping trip, was not a
"recreational facility" within the meaning of § 15.1-291. DePriest v. Pearson, 239 Va. 134,
135, 387 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1990).
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-38 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1990); see also id. § 32.1-36.1
(providing confidentiality of test for HIV, civil penalty for unlawful disclosure and personal
action for damages). Persons exempt from liability under this section are authorized to dis-
close HIV testing information only to those persons or entities set out in this Code section.
Amendments to these Code provisions resulted from the recommendations of the Joint Sub-
committee Studying AIDS. See Digest of Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia at the
1990 Session, published by the Virginia Code Commission and Division of Legislative
Services.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-38 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
16. Id. The 1990 amendment to this section clarified that no duty to notify is imposed
upon blood collection agencies or tissue banks.
17. See id. § 32.1-36.1(D).
18. Id. § 46.2-1231.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
19. Id.
20. H.B. 356, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
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conduct, . . . a knowing violation of criminal law, or ... [gross
negligence].'
The General Assembly also failed to pass a proposed amendment
extending immunity to employers who agree to release employees
from work to serve on volunteer rescue squads.22 The amendment
would have protected employers from liability for the acts or omis-
sions resulting from the rescue work of employees who provide
emergency care during their regular work hours.23
B. Defenses and Bars to Recovery
The General Assembly refused to relax barriers to plaintiff's
ability to recover from defendants by failing to pass several bills in
the tort area. The General Assembly defeated a bill to change the
law of contributory negligence.24 Contributory negligence is a com-
plete bar to relief under Virginia law.25 The proposed bill would
have introduced comparative fault into Virginia tort law.2
The General Assembly also failed to pass a bill repealing the no-
tice of claim requirement applicable to claims against a city or
town. The notice provision has generated significant litigation in
recent years.28 However, it remains as a trap for the unwary party
21. Id.
22. H.B. 785, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990) (proposed amendment to VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-225 (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
23. Id.
24. H.B. 1047, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
25. See Smith v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 204 Va. 128, 129 S.E.2d 655 (1963); cf. Ho-
ban v. Grumman Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (E.D. Va. 1989).
26. The bill provided as follows:
§ 8.01-44.3. Contributory negligence not bar to recovery.-In all actions brought here-
after for personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage, the fact that the per-
son injured or killed, or the owner of the damaged property or person having control
over the property, may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar re-
covery, but the damages shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such persons. However, such person shall recover only if such
person's negligence is not greater that the combined negligence of all other parties.
H.B. 1047, Va. General Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990). The bill had 26 patrons from the House
and Senate combined.
27. H.B. 544, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990). The bill sought repeal of VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-222 (Repl. Vol. 1984). The proposed bill referred to counties, as well as cities
and towns. Id. However, the notice of claim provision under § 8.01-222 applies only to cities
and towns. Id. The notice provision would have been repealed as to any cause of action
accruing on or after July 1, 1990. H.B. 544.
28. See, e.g., Miles v. City of Richmond, 236 Va. 341, 373 S.E.2d 715 (1988); Town of
Crewe v. Marler, 228 Va. 109, 319 S.E.2d 748 (1984). The Supreme Court of Virginia inter-
prets the Code section to be "mandatory, not jurisdictional," and its terms are to be "con-
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injured on city or town property.
C. Releases and Covenants Not To Sue
A release or covenant not to sue does not discharge other tort-
feasors unless the terms of the document so provide. 29 The release
or covenant also releases the tort-feasor from all liability for con-
tribution to any other tort-feasor20 The General Assembly at-
tempted, but failed, to amend this section of the Code to provide
that "the discharged tort-feasor may still be liable as a contractual
indemnitor or as a noncontractual indemnitor to an indemnitee
whose sole liability flows constructively, vicariously, or derivatively
from the negligence of the discharged tort-feasor. "31
D. Presumptions
A proposal to create a rebuttable presumption of negligence in
automobile cases failed during the 1990 Session of the General As-
sembly.32 The bill would have applied to actions for personal in-
jury, wrongful death, or property damage s.3  The presumption
would have arisen
upon proof by any party to the suit that the motor vehicle operated
by the party alleged to have been negligent was driven to the left of
the highway in violation of § 46.2-802 or subdivision 5 or 6 of § 46.2-
804 or that such vehicle left the traveled portion of the highway on
either side, resulting in the injury, death, or damage."'
strued liberally." Miles, 236 Va. at 344, 373 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Marler, 228 Va. at 112, 319
S.E.2d at 749).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1990). But see Courtney v. Fogelson, 16
Va. Cir. 399 (Richmond 1989) (tort-feasor who is sued for aggravating the original injury
entitled to credit for payments made by released tort-feasor to plaintiff).
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
31. H.B. 155, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess (1990).
32. H.B. 278, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
33. Id.
34. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-802 (Repl. Vol. 1989) provides that a driver shall drive on
the right side of the highway except when overtaking and passing another vehicle. VA. CoDE
ANN. § 46.2-804(6) provides that no vehicle shall cross a double solid line except in certain
circumstances.
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E. Damages
The General Assembly did not pass a bill to revise the cap on
punitive damages awards in civil actions. The present cap on puni-
tive damages is $350,000. 3r The proposed bill would have limited
recovery to "the greater of $350,000 or five percent of the defend-
ant's net worth." 6 The addition of the net worth provision would
have impacted greatly on business entities. The proposed bill de-
fined "net worth" for corporations and partnerships as "net stock-
holders' equity, total shareholders' equity, aggregate partners' eq-
uity, total partners' equity" or as otherwise defined pursuant to
generally accepted accounting principles.3 7
In actions by property owners against parents for damage caused
by minors living with their parents, recovery is limited to $750."' A
bill to raise the limit to $5,000 failed in the 1990 Session of the
General Assembly.39
II. CASE LAW
A. Intentional Torts
1. Generally
In Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., ° the Supreme
Court of Virginia had an opportunity to clarify Virginia law on the
distinction between negligence, gross negligence, and willful and
wanton conduct evidencing a reckless disregard of the safety of
others.41 The plaintiff alleged that his Boy Scout master sexually
molested him. The trial court held that the evidence showed inten-
tional misconduct by the scoutmaster, while the Motion For Judg-
ment alleged that he was reckless and consciously disregarded the
boy's welfare.42 Therefore, the trial court dismissed the scoutmas-
ter from the case.43
The supreme court said that negligence is equated with inadver-
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
36. H.B. 1049, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
37. Id.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
39. H.B. 258, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990).
40. 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990).
41. Id. at 579-84, 391 S.E.2d at 326-29.
42. Id. at 575, 391 S.E.2d at 323.
43. See id.
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tent neglect of a duty.44 In contrast, willful and wanton conduct, or
reckless misconduct, is equated with purpose or design, actual or
constructive. 45 An actor guilty of willful or wanton conduct intends
his act, but not the resulting harm.46 However, the actor is con-
scious that his act is likely to, or probably will, cause harm.4 7 Fi-
nally, intentional conduct requires proof that the actor intended to
cause harm.48
Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated:
While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor
does not intend to cause harm which results from it. It is enough
that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that
there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he
hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless. How-
ever, a strong probability is a different thing from the substantial
certainty without which he cannot be said to intend the harm in
which his act results.49
The evidence in Infant C. did not show any intent to cause harm
to the boy. Instead, the defendant's motivation was deliberate self-
gratification with a total disregard of the consequences to his vic-
tim. Therefore, the plaintiffs' pleading was sufficient, and the case
was remanded for proceedings against the scoutmaster.5"
The plaintiff in Woodbury v. Courtney51 alleged a battery by a
physician who performed a partial mastectomy allegedly without
the plaintiff's consent. The physician claimed he had permission to
perform a "biopsy. ' 52 The trial court struck the battery claim be-
cause plaintiff presented no expert testimony on the battery issue.
The supreme court reversed, stating that expert evidence was not
required to show that the physician exceeded the scope of plain-
44. Id. at 582, 391 S.E.2d at 327-28 (citing Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 231, 89
S.E.2d 32, 35 (1955)).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 582, 391 S.E.2d at 328.
47. Id. at 582-83, 391 S.E.2d at 328.
48. Id. at 582, 391 S.E.2d at 328.
49. Id. at 582-83, 391 S.E.2d at 328 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 com-
ment f (1965)).
50. Id. at 583-84, 391 S.E.2d at 328-29.
51. 239 Va. 651, 391 S.E.2d 293 (1990).
52. Id. at 653, 391 S.E.2d at 293.
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tiff's permission.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Supreme Court of Virginia has severely limited recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Ely v. Whitlock,"4
the plaintiffs failed to allege that the defendant filed an ethical
complaint "for the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress
upon them, or that she intended her specific conduct and knew or
should have known that emotional distress would likely result. 5 5
In Ruth v. Fletcher,56 the defendant mother convinced the plain-
tiff that he was the father of the defendant's unborn child. The
couple never married. The plaintiff, however, attended childbirth
classes and helped to name the child. After the child's birth, the
plaintiff developed a warm and loving relationship with his young
son, and the plaintiff's parents set up trust funds for the boy.
5 7
Years later, the defendant and her new husband initiated adoption
proceedings where they proved that the plaintiff was not the boy's
natural father .5  The trial court then permanently denied the
plaintiff all custody and visitation rights.5 9 The supreme court held
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant acted inten-
tionally or recklessly to hurt the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff failed
to prove the necessary element to recover for emotional distress.6 0
Consistent with these Virginia cases, the federal district court in
Simmons v. Norfolk & Western Railway,61 held that plaintiffs in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claims failed to "meet the
requirements under Virginia law for recovery." 62 The plaintiff
claimed he was harassed at work, screamed at and cursed in pub-
lic, and continually ordered from job to job.6 The court found that
such conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness required
53. Id. at 654, 391 S.E.2d 295; see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
54. 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989).
55. Id. at 677, 385 S.E.2d at 897.
56. 237 Va. 366, 377 S.E.2d 412 (1989).
57. 237 Va. at 369, 377 S.E.2d at 414.
58. 237 Va. at 371-72, 377 S.E.2d at 415.
59. Id. at 372, 377 S.E.2d at 415.
60. Id. at 373, 377 S.E.2d at 416; see generally Shepherd, Legal Issues Involving Chil-
dren: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RicH. L. REv. 724 (1989).
61. 734 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Va. 1990).
62. Id. at 231.
63. Id. at 232.
1990]
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for recovery. 4
B. Negligence
1. Generally
The Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the long-standing
principle that negligence cannot be presumed from the mere occur-
rence of damage in Town of Vinton v. Bryant.65 In Bryant, plain-
tiffs alleged negligence against the town for allowing sewage to
back up into their home. Though the town's practice was to clean
the sewers each summer, the bhckup was caused by a blockage in
the sewer during the winter. The plaintiffs argued that sewers are
more likely to clog in winter, that the town knew that clogs were
more likely to occur in winter, and therefore, a jury should con-
clude that the backup would not have occurred if the town had
cleaned the sewers in winter.6 The court found the evidence insuf-
ficient. "[A]ll the Bryants proved was that a blockage occurred in
the Town's sewer line and that they suffered damage as a result.
Lacking is proof of the essential element of negligence as the cause
of the blockage. '6 7
In a case of first impression in Virginia, the supreme court held
in Kalafut v. Gruver68 that an action for a child's wrongful death
may be brought against a tort-feasor whose negligence occurred
when the decedent was in the mother's womb. In Kalafut, a preg-
nant woman was involved in an automobile accident caused by the
defendant. A month later, the mother prematurely delivered her
child, who lived for only two hours after birth.6 9 The court rejected
the defendant's contention that the child's estate could not recover
because the child was not a "person," and thus, had no right of
action at the time the accident occurred.70 The court also distin-
guished two cases involving stillborn children,7 1 and, relying on the
64. Id.; see also Owens v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 757, 760 (W.D. Va. 1989)(de-
fendants' conduct "does not even approach behavior which exceeds all bounds of decency
and is intolerable in a civilized community"); cf. Fairchilde v. Erickson, 18 Va. Cir. 142
(Fairfax County 1989) (no independent tort action for "outrageous conduct").
65. 238 Va. 229, 384 S.E.2d 76 (1989).
66. Id. at 230, 384 S.E.2d at 76.
67. Id. at 231, 384 S.E.2d at 77.
68. 239 Va. 278, 278, 389 S.E.2d 681 (1990).
69. Id. at 280, 389 S.E.2d at 682.
70. Id. at 282, 389 S.E.2d at 683.
71. Id. at 282, 389 S.E.2d at 682-84 (citing Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, stated: "A tort-feasor who causes
harm to an unborn child is subject to liability to the child, or to
the child's estate, for the harm to the child, if the child is born
alive." 2
The supreme court emphasized again in Lawson v. Doe,"3 that
"[ilt is incumbent on [a] plaintiff who alleges negligence to show
why and how the accident happened, and if that is left to conjec-
ture, guess or random judgment, he cannot recover. '7 4 In Lawson,
the trial court set aside a jury verdict for the plaintiff. 5 The plain-
tiff's decedent was struck by an object as he walked along a road.76
The plaintiff's theory was that an unknown motorist drove by the
decedent and hit decedent with a board which unlawfully pro-
truded from the vehicle. 77
The circumstantial evidence included testimony of witnesses
who heard a crash and a truck being thrown in gear, a witness who
saw a truck traveling at high speed, the placement of a board in
the middle of the road, and the fact that the decedent had marks
across his abdomen similar to the size of the board.78 However, the
supreme court said that the plaintiff lacked evidence such as the
direction in which decedent was walking, where the board came
from, or, if it came from a vehicle, how far it extended beyond the
vehicle side, or whether it was dislodged by some non-negligent
(1986); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969) (no cause of action
for wrongful death of stillborn child)).
72. Kalafut, 239 Va. at 283-84, 389 S.E.2d at 683-84. The court expressly saved for an-
other day the discussion of the cause of action/right of action dichotomy with respect to the
statute of limitations. Id. at 286 n*, 389 S.E.2d at 685 n*. This case will undoubtedly have
ramifications in all types of cases, including medical malpractice, automobile collision, and
toxic tort types of claims. The court, however, inserted a caveat with regard to causation:
We do not limit the application of this rule to unborn children who are viable [capa-
ble of existence independent of the mother] at the time of the tortious act. ...
Given the present state of medical technology, however, the proof of causation obvi-
ously becomes increasingly more difficult as the focus moves to the beginning of
pregnancy.
Id. at 284, 389 S.E.2d at 684.
73. 239 Va. 477, 391 S.E.2d 333 (1990).
74. Id. at 482, 391 S.E.2d. at 335 (quoting Weddle v. Draper, 204 Va. 319, 322, 130 S.E.2d
462, 465 (1963)).
75. Id. at 477, 391 S.E.2d at 333.
76. Id. at 479-80, 391 S.E.2d at 334-35.
77. Id. at 480, 391 S.E.2d at 334; see VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1111 (Repl. Vol. 1984) ("No
vehicle shall carry any load extending more than six inches beyond the line of the fender or
body").
78. Lawson, 239 Va. at 479-80, 391 S.E.2d at 334.
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force.79 Without such evidence, plaintiff's recovery was entirely
speculative.80
Marshall v. Winstons" addressed the issue whether the sheriff
and a jailer for the City of Richmond owed a duty to protect a
member of the general public from harm by a mistakenly released
convict."2 The supreme court held that no duty existed, after
searching for a special relationship between the defendants and
the criminal, or between the defendants and the murder victim,
which would give rise to such a duty. The court found no allega-
tions in the Motion For Judgment that the defendants "knew or
should have known that Mundy would likely cause bodily harm to
others if he were not controlled. 8s3 M6reover, the court found no
allegation in the Motion For Judgment that decedent was an iden-
tifiable person to whom defendants owed a duty.8 4 Therefore, the
sheriff and the jailer had no civil liability to the plaintiff for the
convict's brutal murder of the plaintiff's husband. 5
A driver is under no duty to signal safe passage to a pedestrian.
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized, in Cofield v.
Nuckles,8 6 that a driver who acts gratuitously in signaling a pedes-
trian across a highway may be guilty of negligence.8 7
79. Id. at 481, 391 S.E.2d at 335.
80. Id. at 482, 391 S.E.2d at 336.
81. 239 Va. 315, 389 S.E.2d 902 (1990).
82. Id. at 316-17, 389 S.E.2d at 903. The convict, Marvin Mundy, was mistakenly released
from jail on two occasions. Id. at 317, 389 S.E.2d at 903. The murder occurred while Mundy
was illegally out of confinement the second time. Id. Mundy was convicted of capital mur-
der. Mundy v. Commonwealth, - Va. App. -, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990).
83. Marshall, 239 Va. at 319, 389 S.E.2d at 904.
84. Id. at 320, 389 S.E.2d at 905. Pfesumably then, the plaintiff under the circumstances
of this case could have survived demurrer and maintained an action had the pleadings con-
tained the appropriate allegations. Interestingly, the trial court and the appellate court rec-
ognized the "troubling" facts that Mundy carried a clip containing 50 rounds of ammuni-
tion, that he wore a bullet-proof vest when he was arrested, that he threatened the arresting
officer and carried a concealed weapon. Id. at'318-19, 389 S.E.2d at 904. This evidence was
nevertheless insufficient to show that defendants knew or should have known that Mundy
would go on a murder spree. Id.
85. Id. Compare the recent United States Supreme Court decision in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). In DeShaney, the Court ruled
that the state's knowledge of a child abuse victim's jeopardy did not establish a special
relationship giving rise to a constitutional duty to protect him because the injury did not
occur while the child was in state custody. DeShaney, 109 S. Ct. at 1004-06.
86. 239 Va. 186, 387 S.E.2d 493 (1990).
87. Id. at 192, 387 S.E.2d at 496. The evidence in Cofield was insufficient to find the
driver negligent because he checked his mirror and did not have reason to see the approach-
ing van that hit the plaintiff. Id. at 192-93, 387 S.E.2d 496-97; see infra notes 246-53 and
accompanying text.
TORT LAW
A federal district court rejected a negligent hiring claim made by
a baseball fan against a minor league baseball team. 8 In Simmons,
the disgruntled fan heckled two players throughout the game. Af-
terwards, the fan and the two players confronted each other in the
parking lot, and a fight ensued, resulting in injuries to the fan.89
The court ruled that the fan did not meet the negligent hiring test
recognized under Virginia law.e0 Since the employer had no knowl-
edge of past actions which would have suggested that the players
were "unfit," the employer was not liable for the players' actions. el
2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Myseros v. Sissler,92 "sweating, dizziness, nausea, difficulty in
sleeping and breathing, constriction of the coronary vessels, . . .
chest pain, hypertension, unstable angina, . . . marked ischemia,
loss of appetite and weight, change in heart function, and problems
with the heart muscle" constituted insufficient evidence of physical
injury to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.9 3
These were merely symptoms of an emotional disturbance for
which there could be no recovery absent resulting physical injury.
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia set aside the plaintiff's
jury verdict and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.9 4
88. Simmons v. Baltimore Orioles, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 79 (W.D. Va. 1989).
89. Id. at 80.
90. Id. at 81. The tort of negligent hiring was set forth recently in J. v. Victory Taberna-
cle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 372 S.E.2d 391 (1988). "The test is whether the employer
has negligently placed an unfit person in an employment situation involving an unreasona-
ble risk of harm to others." Simmons, 712 F. Supp. at 81 (quoting Victory Tabernacle, 236
Va. at 211, 372 S.E.2d at 394).
91. Id. The court also rejected the fan's argument that the Orioles were liable to him for
failing, as owner of the premises, to keep the parking lot safe. Id. at 82. Relying on Wright v.
Webb, 234 Va. 527, 362 S.E.2d 919 (1987), the court said "the climate-of-fear rule ... was
clearly not intended to protect a person who has instigated the problem." Simmons, 712 F.
Supp. at 82. There was therefore no imminent probability of harm against which the Orioles
should have protected. Id.; see also Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir.
1990)(sexual harassment case in which court said Virginia law does not recognize tort of
negligent supervision even where agency relationship facilitated consummation of tort).
92. 239 Va. 8, 387 S.E.2d 463 (1990).
93. Id. at 11-12, 387 S.E.2d at 465-66.
94. Id. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 466; see Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973)
(cited in Myseros, 239 Va. at 9, 387 S.E.2d at 464).
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3. Gross Negligence
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed a $350,000 verdict
against a police officer in Meagher v. Johnson.5 The court ruled
that the plaintiff failed to show gross negligence as a matter of law.
The police officer was acting in the discharge of his official duties
when his cruiser struck the plaintiff, who was fleeing arrest.9 The
officer was in hot pursuit, had engaged his lights and siren, was
traveling within the acceptable speed limits for emergencies, and
applied his brakes immediately when the plaintiff darted in front
of the cruiser.97 These circumstances did not exhibit "indifference
to others as constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting
to a complete neglect of the safety of [another]."9
C. Professional Malpractice
A lawyer who drafted wills for the plaintiffs' grandparents faced
a $3,475,000 legal malpractice claim in Copenhaver v. Rogers."
While the plaintiffs held the remainder interest in their mother's
share of the estate, the defendant lawyer neglected to include in
the wills legally sufficient trust terms and other tax savings provi-
sions which would have benefitted the plaintiffs. 100 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reaffirmed the well-settled rule in Virginia that
in a tort claim solely for economic losses "no cause of action exists
. . . absent privity of contract."'10 1 The plaintiffs' tort "claims were
properly rejected on demurrer."'1 2
95. 239 Va. 380, 389 S.E.2d 310 (1990).
96. Id. at 383-84, 389 S.E.2d at 311.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 383, 389 S.E.2d at 311 (quoting Ferguson v. Ferguson, 212 Va. 86, 92, 181 S.E.2d
648, 653 (1971)); see also Jefferson v. Howard, 16 Va. Cir. 195 (Richmond 1989) (policeman
who struck a civilian car while responding to call for assistance operated within scope of
employment for purposes of governmental immunity).
99. 238 Va. 361, 384 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
100. Id. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 594.
101. Id. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 595 (citing Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, 236 Va.
419, 425, 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1988)). Note that the supreme court has rejected any tort action
solely to recover economic losses, without mention of privity. "Such economic losses are not
recoverable in tort; they are purely the result of disappointed economic expectations. The
law of contracts provides the sole redress for such claims." Rotunda Condominium Unit
Owners Ass'n v. Rotunda Assocs., 238 Va. 85, 90, 380 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1989). For a discus-
sion regarding abolition of the privity requirement in tort, see Wilkes v. F. L. Smithe Mach.
Co., 704 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Va. 1989).
102. Copenhaver, 238 Va. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 595. For a discussion of the court's rulings
on the contract claims in this case, see Note, Whose Beneficiaries are They Anyway?
Copenhaver v. Rogers and the Attorney's Contract to Prepare a Will in Virginia, 24 U.
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Evidence of professional malpractice was insufficient to create a
jury issue in Seaward International, Inc. v. Price Waterhouse.10 3
In that case, the plaintiffs incurred tax liability because their do-
mestic international sales corporation ("DISC") failed to meet the
qualified export assets ("QEA") test which would have conferred
substantial tax benefits upon the plaintiffs.' The plaintiffs' ac-
countants had predicted that the DISC would have sufficient QEA
to avoid tax problems. 05 The plaintiffs claimed their accounting
firm was negligent in failing to investigate the plaintiffs' records to
reveal incorrect calculations provided by the plaintiff to the ac-
countants.106 No expert testified to the existence of any papers
which would have revealed such errors. The jury was thus left to
speculate on the existence of any documents which, if reviewed by
the accountants, would have made a difference.10 7
The federal court in Timms v. Roseblum, 05 reiterated that, ab-
sent an allegation of outrageous conduct, Virginia law does not al-
low recovery for mental anguish in legal malpractice cases. More-
over, damages for mental anguish are only recoverable in tort
actions. 09 In Timms, the plaintiff had no physical injury and al-
leged no extreme, outrageous, or reckless conduct." 0
D. Abuse of Process and Malicious Prosecution
The courts have had several opportunities recently to consider
abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims."' In Triangle
RICH L. REv. 415 (1990); see also Haddad v. Mays, 18 Va. Cir. 171 (Fairfax County 1989)
(legal malpractice claim must show that outcome of the litigation would have been different
if the attorney had not been negligent).
103. 239 Va. 585, 391 S.E.2d 283 (1990).
104. Id. at 589, 391 S.E.2d at 286.
105. Id. at 588, 391 S.E.2d at 285.
106. Id. at 589, 391 S.E.2d at 287.
107. Id. at 592, 391 S.E.2d 287-88. The court made clear that expert testimony was re-
quired in cases of this kind. "Unless a malpractice case turns upon matters within the com-
mon knowledge of laymen, . . . expert testimony is required to establish the appropriate
professional standard, to establish a deviation from that standard, and to establish that
such a deviation was the proximate cause of the claimed damages." Id. at 592, 391 S.E.2d at
287 (citations omitted).
108. 713 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. Va. 1989); see Ball v. Rosenblum, 18 Va. Cir. 48 (Fairfax
County 1988) (related state court proceeding which was nonsuited).
109. Timms, 713 F. Supp. at 954.
110. Id. at 955. "The simple truth is that mental anguish attends all litigation." Id.
111. See Ely v. Whitlock, 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989) (second abuse of process
element met because the defendant attorney's conduct was not proper in the regular prose-
cution of an ethics complaint); Triangle Auto Auction v. Cash, 238 Va. 183, 380 S.E.2d 649
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Auto Auction, Inc. v. Cash,"2 defendant Triangle sued out a crimi-
nal process against plaintiff Cash for grand larceny by bad check.
Cash paid the outstanding debt, and filed a civil action against Tri-
angle for "malicious abuse of process.""11 3 The Supreme Court of
Virginia set forth the essential elements of abuse of process as fol-
lows: "(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; and (2) an act in the
use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceedings.'1114
The supreme court "assume[d] without deciding that. . .Trian-
gle had an ulterior purpose" for swearing out the warrants."'5 Prior
to the issuance of process, Triangle threatened to send Cash to jail
and withheld information from the Commonwealth's Attorney."16
However, the court found that Cash failed to demonstrate that
Triangle took any action subsequent to the issuance of process
which "abused or perverted the criminal prosecution.'1 7 The court
reemphasized that abuse of process must occur after process is is-
sued in order for a claim to be actionable."
8
The issue in Ely v. Whitlock" 9 centered around the second ele-
ment of an abuse of process claim. In Ely, three lawyers became
embroiled in a bitter dispute arising out of their representation of
opposing parties in a divorce action.'20 Ely filed a motion for a rule
to show cause why the two Whitlocks' licenses to practice law
should not be revoked or suspended. The Whitlocks subsequently
filed suit against Ely for malicious prosecution and abuse of pro-
(1989) (no abuse of process shown because defendant's conduct was not an abuse of a crimi-
nal prosecution after issuing the process); JGS Constr., Inc. v. Mechanicsville Concrete, Inc.,
18 Va. Cir. 313 (Chesterfield County 1989) (filing mechanics lien is not malicious); Coughlan
v. Jim McKay Chevrolet, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 265 (Fairfax County 1989) (lack of probable cause
for warrant is sufficient to state malicious prosecution claim); Wannall v. Hetrick, 17 Va.
Cir. 278 (Fairfax County 1989) (probable cause shown where plaintiff convicted; no im-
proper act occurred after process issued); Montecalvo v. Johnson, 15 Va. Cir. 414 (Richmond
1989) (no probable cause for arrest warrant) (appeal pending as of July 1, 1990, Docket No.
900544).
112. 238 Va. 183, 380 S.E.2d 649 (1989).
113. Id. at 184, 380 S.E.2d at 650.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 186, 380 S.E.2d at 651. There was sufficient evidence that Triangle did so only
to collect the debt owed to it. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 238 Va. 670, 385 S.E.2d 893 (1989).
120. Id. at 672-73, 385 S.E.2d at 894-95.
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cess.121 After Ely filed a disciplinary proceeding against the
Whitlocks, she took depositions to support her claim. 2 2 Therefore,
the second element of an abuse of process claim was met because
Ely's conduct was not proper in the regular prosecution of an eth-
ics complaint.123
The supreme court also held that the Whitlocks failed to show
the required special injury to maintain a malicious prosecution ac-
tion. Anxiety, mental anguish, stress, and threat to livelihood were
the "natural consequence of any disciplinary proceeding.' '124
E. Fraud
In Murray v. Hadid,125 the Supreme Court of Virginia set forth
the general proof requirement for recovery in an action for fraud.
"[A] plaintiff must prove damages which are caused by his detri-
mental reliance on a defendant's material misrepresentations.' ' 2 6
The plaintiffs failed to show causation of damages since their proof
showed only that they were in the same position as they had been
prior to the fraud. 27
Moreover, the supreme court held that plaintiffs were "required
to show sufficient facts and circumstances to permit a jury to make
a reasonable estimate of . . . damages suffered as a result of the
fraud."'2 8 Plaintiffs were builders, but they had never built a
townhouse development and had no experience with such projects.
"[T]he townhouse development would have constituted a new en-
terprise dependent upon too many contingencies to safeguard an
estimate of damages."' 29 Therefore, plaintiffs' evidence was specu-
121. Id. at 672, 385 S.E.2d at 894-95. The Whitlocks also sued for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 672, 385 S.E.2d at 895. For a discussion of those claims, see supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
122. Ely, 238 Va. at 675-76, 385 S.E.2d at 897.
123. Id. at 676, 385 S.E.2d at 897.
124. Id. at 675, 385 S.E.2d at 896.
125. 238 Va. 722, 385 S.E.2d 898 (1989). In Murray, the plaintiffs wanted to obtain land
for a townhouse project. They negotiated with the defendant with the understanding that
the defendant would purchase the land and allow the plaintiffs to build the project. The
defendant purchased the land with the help of the plaintiffs' negotiations, but subsequently
hired other builders to construct a condominium project. Id.
126. Id. at 730, 385 S.E.2d at 903.
127. Id. at 731, 385 S.E.2d at 904. "The usual remedy in an action for fraud is to restore
the defrauded party to the position he held prior to the fraud." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 732, 385 S.E.2d at 905.
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lative and they could not recover.' 30
In Elliott v. Shore Stop, Inc.,31 the supreme court recognized an
action in tort for fraud and deceit where a promise was made with
intent not to perform it. Ordinarily, a fraud claim involves misrep-
resentation of a present or preexisting fact.132 The court ruled that
the defendant's promise, which he never intended to honor, was a
misrepresentation of a present fact.13 3
The plaintiffs in Starks v. Albemarle County34 alleged that the
defendant withheld information to defraud the plaintiffs and to in-
duce them to buy a home, which was in a flood prone area. The
court held that the one-year statute of limitations for fraud barred
the action.'3 5 In addition, the court held that the caveat emptor
doctrine barred the plaintiffs' claims.136 The court noted that the
plaintiffs could have been more diligent in their investigation and
inspection of the property before their purchase. 3 7
F. Tortious Interference with Contract
In Elliott v. Shore Stop, Inc.,' the Supreme Court of Virginia
found the plaintiff's allegations sufficient to sustain a claim of tor-
tious interference with contractual relations. The plaintiff alleged
that she had an employment contract with her employer. 13 9 She
130. Id. Justice Stephenson, joined by Chief Justice Carrico and Justice Thomas, dis-
sented. The dissent focused on the evidence of profits plaintiffs would have gained from
purchasing the property, even if they had chosen not to build the townhouses. Defendant
purchased the land for $984,000. It later sold for $6.7 million. Id. at 734, 385 S.E.2d at 906
(Stephenson, J., dissenting); see generally Campbell v. Bettius, 18 Va. Cir. 95 (Fairfax
County 1989) (plaintiff required to allege fraud with particularity).
131. 238 Va. 237, 384 S.E.2d 752 (1989).
132. Id. at 245, 384 S.E.2d at 756 (citing Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va. 343, 351,
297 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1982)).
133. Id. at 245, 384 S.E.2d at 756. For a more in-depth discussion of employee relations,
see Billingsley & Boyette, Employment Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L.
REv. 567 (1990). But cf. Owens v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 757, 758 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(essential element of fraud is a misrepresentation, and a promise is not a representation).
134. 716 F. Supp. 934 (W.D. Va. 1989).
135. Id. at 936 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248); House v. Kirby, 233 Va. 197, 355 S.E.2d
303 (1987).
136. Starks, 716 F.Supp. at 937. Caveat emptor applies in the absence of any action to
divert a party from making inquiries or from inspecting the premises. Id. (citing Kuczman-
ski v. Gill, 225 Va. 367, 302 S.E.2d 48 (1983)); see Armentrout v. French, 220 Va. 458, 258
S.E.2d 519 (1979); see also Boris v. Hill, 237 Va. 160, 375 S.E.2d 716 (1989)(defendant enti-
tled to caveat emptor instruction).
137. Starks, 716 F. Supp. at 939.
138. 238 Va. 237, 384 S.E.2d 752 (1989).
139. Id. at 246, 384 S.E.2d at 757.
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alleged further that the employer's agent and an independent third
party conspired to rig a polygraph so that the plaintiff would fail,
thus giving the employer just cause to fire her.14 Relying on Wor-
rie v. Boze,' 4' the court said "an action in tort exists against those
who conspire to induce a breach of contract and that. . . rule will
be applied to hold one liable, along with an independent third
party, for conspiring to breach his own contract." '142
The supreme court reversed a jury verdict in favor of a plaintiff
who claimed that a real estate broker intentionally interfered with
a real estate sales contract.143 In Century-21, the supreme court
said that the evidence failed to show that the real estate broker
engaged in intentional interference which induced or caused the
purchasers to breach their contract with the plaintiff.144 The bro-
ker did not "[pursue] a scheme designed wrongfully" to interfere
with the purchasers' contract with the plaintiff seller.' 45 If any-
thing, the purchasers urged the defendant broker to continue
showing them other properties even though they had signed a sales
contract to purchase the plaintiff's home. 4 e
G. Defamation
In Freedlander v. Edens Broadcasting, Inc.,41 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that a de-
fendant's broadcast of a song poking fun at well-known local
figures was not actionable. The court found, as a matter of law,
140. Id.
141. 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956).
142. Elliott, 238 Va. at 246, 384 S.E.2d at 757 (citing Worrie, 198 Va. at 540-41, 95 S.E.2d
at 198-99).
143. Century-21 v. Eider, 239 Va. 637, 391 S.E.2d 296 (1990).
144. Id. at 642, 391 S.E.2d at 299. Tortious interference with contract requires evidence of
the existence of a valid contractual relationship, knowledge of the relationship on the part
of the interferer, intentional interference inducing or causing the breach or termination of
the agreement, and resultant damage to the party whose relationship is disrupted. Chaves v.
Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (1985). The Chaves test was cited recently in
National Org. For Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1983). There,
the plaintiffs sought to block the defendants from "trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, im-
peding or obstructing ingress or egress from" abortion clinics. Id. at 1486. The plaintiffs
alleged tortious interference with business relationships. Id. at 1495. The court rejected the
claim because the evidence failed to show that the defendants knew about any contract
between the clinics and the women seeking abortions. Id. at 1495-96.
145. Century-21, 239 Va. at 642, 391 S.E.2d at 299 (quoting Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va.
112, 222, 335 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1985).
146. Id.
147. 734 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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that the song was not defamatory. 148 Alternatively, the court held
that the plaintiffs were public figures and that defendants had no
actual malice in broadcasting the song.
149
In determining that the song was not defamatory per se, the
court stated that the song contained no words implying a criminal
offense punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpi-
tude. 150 Moreover, the court determined that the song depicted the
truth.'51 The court also ruled that the content of the song and the
context of its delivery made clear that it was intended to "amuse,
rather than injure," and that a reasonable person could not help
but find it humorous. 52
Finally, the court held that "[since plaintiff Freedlander] thrust
himself into the vortex of a public issue, he created the public con-
troversy."' 53 Therefore, he was required to show that "the allegedly
defamatory statements were made with actual malice-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."'5 4
The plaintiff in Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con-
naughton55 successfully proved actual malice in a libel action
against a newspaper. The plaintiff was a candidate for judicial of-
fice, and was therefore deemed to be a public figure. 156 The news-
paper published a damaging story in spite of the plaintiff's efforts
to provide the reporter with proof of the story's falsity.157 In addi-
148. Id. at 228.
149. Id. at 224.
150. Id. at 225-26. The plaintiffs were involved in a well-publicized bankruptcy involving
the failure of a second-mortgage company. The song made references to "live-in lover,"
"money jockey," "the debts, they're a-rising," and "the Feds are closing in on you." Id. at
223. The court held that these words were not actionable per se because violations of the
fornication and cohabitation statutes do not result in imprisonment. See VA. CODE ANN. §§
18.2-344, -345 (Repl. Vol. 1975). Moreover, the conduct mentioned does not involve moral
turpitude as defined by Virginia law. Freedlander, 734 F. Supp. at 226; see also Great
Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 142, 147, 334 S.E.2d 846, 850 (1985). The court
also found no defamation per quad, which arises by innuendo from words combined with
extrinsic facts. Freedlander, 734 F. Supp. at 226-28.
151. Id. at 227.
152. Id. at 228.
153. Id. at 230.
154. Id.
155. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
156. Id. at 2681; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); cf. Blue Ridge
Bank v. Veribanc, Inc., 866 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1989)(bank was not public figure required to
prove actual malice in defamation case).
157. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. at 2692-94.
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tion, the reporter never interviewed a key witness and ignored con-
tradictory evidence provided by five other people.158 Although the
failure to investigate alone is not proof of actual malice, the evi-
dence here showed an intent to publish regardless of what the facts
showed.1
5
H. Products Liability
The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiffs' claims against
a manufacturer and supplier were time-barred in Eagles Court
Condominium Unit Owners Association v. Heatilator.60 The
plaintiffs' claims involved a defective steel fireplace system. The
fireplace system caused a fire in a condominium unit which spread
to several other units and the common areas of the complex.' 6 ' The
Supreme Court of Virginia first construed the applicable statute of
repose as barring any claims of negligent design and claims against
the installer of the fireplace system, regardless of whether the sys-
tem was characterized as "equipment or machinery. "162
Whether the claims also were barred against the manufacturer
and supplier depended on the characterization of the fireplace sys-
tem as equipment or machinery. 6 3 The court ruled that the plain-
tiffs' claims were not time-barred by the general five-year limita-
158. Id. at 2697-98.
159. Id. at 2698.
160. 239 Va. 325, 389 S.E.2d 304 (1990).
161. Id. at 327, 389 S.E.2d at 305.
162. The statute of repose provides as follows:
No action to recover for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improve-
ment to real property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sus-
tained as a result of such injury, shall be brought against any person performing or
furnishing the design, planning, surveying, supervision of construction, or construc-
tion of such improvement to real property more than five years after the performance
of furnishing of such services and construction.
The limitation prescribed in this section shall not apply to the manufacturer or
supplier of any equipment or machinery or other articles installed in a structure upon
real property, nor to any person in actual possession and in control of the improve-
ment as owner, tenant or otherwise at the time the defective or unsafe condition of
such improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or damage for which
the action is brought; rather each such action shall be brought within the time next
after such injury occurs as provided in §§ 8.01-243 and 8.01-246.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
163. Eagles Court, 239 Va. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 306. The same determination was neces-
sary in Wilkes v. F. L. Smithe Mach. Co., 704 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Va. 1989). In that case,
the court, construing Virginia law, analogized the problem of characterizing machinery and
equipment to cases defining "fixtures" attached to real property. Id. at 682.
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tion period.' Rather, the more specific statute of repose applied,
which states that an "action shall be brought within the time next
after such injury occurs."'6 5 The limitation period, therefor(, ran
from the date of the fire if the fireplace system was "equipment or
machinery.' 6 6 Thus, the supreme court remanded to the trial
court to make that "dispositive factual determination.'
' 67
Hoban v. Grumman Corp.6 8 involved a design defect claim
agaim-' the manufacturer of a military aircraft. The plaintiff's evi-
dence failed to show a defect, failed to resolve whether the defect
in the aircraft caused it to crash, and failed to state facts rising
above mere conjecture, speculation, or guess.169 Furthermore, the
evidence showed that the pilot contributed to the accident by vio-
lating course rules and standard operating procedures. Therefore,
he was guilty of contributory negligence barring his estate from re-
covery. 70 The pilot also assumed the risk because he knew that
potential malfunctions could occur, especially in the dangerous
"low transition" maneuvers he undertook. 17
In Laddeke v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,' the court consid-
ered an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim by home-
owners against the manufacturer of their home heating, air condi-
tioning, and hot water system. After years of trying to fix the
system, the seller and manufacturer abandoned repair attempts,
and the homeowners filed suit against them. 73 The homeowners'
emotional distress was inflicted, if at all, more than two years
before they filed suit, when they first learned that the system's de-
fects could not be repaired. 74 Thus, their claim on this count was
barred.
164. Eagles Court, 239 Va. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 307 (citing former VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24;
rec:dified as id. § 8.01-243(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990)).
165. Id. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 306 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Repl. Vol. 1984)).
166. Id. at 330, 389 S.E.2d at 306-07.
167. Id. at 330-31, 389 S.E.2d at 307; see also Moore v Dallas Corp., 17 Va. Cir. 97
(Fairfax County 1984) (garage door is equipment and machinery for purpose of § 8.01-250);
Martin v. Guardite, Inc., 16 Va. Cir. 273 (Richmond 1989) (former § 8-24.2 applied to man-
ufacturers of machinery incorporated into buildings), writ denied, No. 891402, Feb. 23, 1990
(Va. Sup. Ct.).
168. 717 F. Supp. 1129 (E.D. Va. 1989).
169. Id. at 1135.
170. Id. at 1137.
171. Id. at 1137-38.
172. 239 Va. 203, 387 S.E.2d 502 (1990).
173. Id. at 204-05, 387 S.E.2d at 503.
174. Id. at 207, 387 S.E.2d at 504.
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The plaintiffs' continued use of a defective product did not bar
their recovery in White Consolidated Industry v. Swiney. 175 The
plaintiffs noticed that their new stove operated only at high tem-
peratures and that the stove's clock malfunctioned. 17 The plain-
tiffs finally complained to the seller six months after they pur-
chased the stove, but no further action was taken.177 While the
plaintiffs were away, the stove ignited and burned their house to
the ground. 78 The court found that foreseeable misuse of a prod-
uct is not a defense to a consumer's claim for breach of implied
warranty where the defect merely restricts the utility of the
product. 79
In Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,' 8 the plaintiff brought
a products liability claim against the manufacturer of a commercial
dryer. The defendant manufacturer impeached the plaintiff with
evidence of the plaintiff's criminal conviction.'" The United States
Supreme Court, pointing to the inartful drafting of Rule 609(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stated:
[W]e hold that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) requires a judge
to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior fel-
ony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness
or to the party offering the testimony. Thus no error occurred when
the jury in this product liability suit learned through impeaching
cross-examination that plaintiff Green was a convicted felon. 8'
I. Strict Liability
The federal courts continue to correctly note that Virginia has
never recognized a claim for strict liability in tort. 8 ' However, the
District Court for the Western District of Virginia stated the gen-
eral rule and then extended an exception to that rule in Breeding
175. 237 Va. 23, 376 S.E.2d 283 (1989).
176. Id. at 25, 376 S.E.2d at 284.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 26, 376 S.E.2d at 284.
179. Id. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286. The court refused to discuss whether the doctrine of
assumption of the risk is a defense to a breach of implied warranty claim under Virginia
law. Id.
180. 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989).
181. Id. at 1983.
182. Id. at 1993-94.
183. Wilkes v. F. L. Smithe Mach. Co., 704 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Va. 1989).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
v. Koch Carbon, Inc.18 4 The exception involves injury to land. Vir-
ginia law imposes strict liability where a person removes subjacent
support for the surface and causes it to subside.8 5 The issue in
Breeding was whether strict liability applied to a claim that subsi-
dence caused harm to structural improvements on the land. 8 6
Analyzing English and American precedent, the court concluded
Virginia would adopt the position of the Restatement, the English
Courts, and the American Courts which have specifically addressed
the issue, that if one withdraws subjacent support for the land of
another and subsidence results, if the subsidence would have oc-
curred even in the absence of any artificial additions to the land,
then he is strictly liable not only for the harm to the land caused
by the subsidence, but also for any harm to the artificial additions
on the land that results from the subsidence. 187
J. Elements of Proof Generally
1. Proximate Cause
In Koutsounadis v. England, 88 the plaintiff, who was injured
when he struck the defendant's stationary car, sought to introduce
evidence that the defendant had fallen asleep at the wheel, caused
an accident, and left his darkened, disabled automobile blocking a
portion of the highway. The trial court excluded the plaintiff's evi-
dence because "the issue for the jury [was] to determine what hap-
pened after the incident as to whether or not the defendant was
negligent in removing his automobile from the highway." 89 The
supreme court characterized the problem as one of proximate
cause, stating that it is within the jury's province to look at a "suc-
cession of facts and events and decide whether those facts and
events are naturally and probably connected with each other in a
continuous sequence."' 90 The court concluded that evidence of the
defendant's negligent acts was admissible to show the natural and
unbroken chain of events leading to plaintiff's injuries.191
184. 726 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. Va. 1989).
185. Id. at 646.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 648.
188. 238 Va. 128, 380 S.E.2d 644 (1989).
189. Id. at 130, 380 S.E.2d at 646 (emphasis added)(quoting the trial court record).
190. Id. at 132, 380 S.E.2d at 647.
191. Id.
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The trial court erred in striking plaintiff's evidence of concurring
negligence in West v. Critzer.192 In West, the plaintiff's decedent
was riding in a pick-up truck that apparently pulled out in front of
a tractor trailer rig.193 The plaintiff alleged that the concurring
negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the dece-
dent's death.1 94 The driver of the tractor trailer did not brake,
swerve, or take any other evasive action because he had the right
of way, and he "'assumed' the [pick-up] would stop."' 95 The trac-
tor trailer was traveling at the posted fifty-five-mile-per-hour
speed limit, and a flashing yellow light faced him.' 96 Under these
circumstances, the jury could have concluded that the tractor
trailer driver failed to maintain a proper lookout, 97 failed to main-
tain a reasonable speed under the circumstances, 19 and failed to
keep his vehicle under control.' 99
2. Presumptions
The Supreme Court of Virginia expressed its strong disapproval
of the so-called "missing witness" instruction in Banks v. Harris.0 0
The instruction gives rise to an inference that the absent witness'
testimony would be adverse to the party failing to call him. The
supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the
plaintiff, an infant, had no memory of the accident in which he was
injured.20' Thus, he was not an available witness who had knowl-
edge of necessary and material facts. Although the court rejected
the instruction based on the facts at hand, Justice Russell wrote a
strong concurrence objecting to the instruction's use in any case:
In my view, the 'missing witness' instruction has outlived its useful-
ness. A case-by-case approach whereby the applicability of the in-
struction depends upon the facts of each case is certain to prove as
192. 238 Va. 356, 383 S.E.2d 726 (1989).
193. Id. at 358, 383 S.E.2d at 727-28.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 359, 383 S.E.2d at 728. "A proper lookout requires the operator to heed what
he sees by taking reasonably prudent action to avoid what the lookout discloses." Id.
198. Id. "The posted speed does not determine whether a particular speed is reasonable
under the circumstances." Id.
199. Id. at 360, 383 S.E.2d at 728. "Control concerns the ability to move the vehicle out of
the path of danger by swerving, braking, or some other maneuver." Id.
200. 238 Va. 81, 380 S.E.2d 634 (1989).
201. Id. at 83, 380 S.E.2d at 635.
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fruitful a source of errors, appeals, and reversals in the future as it
has in the past.2"2
K. Theories of Imputed, Liability
The Supreme Court of Virginia reached opposite results in two
cases concerning liability for the negligence of independent con-
tractors. 0 s In Love v. Schmidt, the landlord could not delegate to
an independent contractor his common law duty to maintain his
premises in a reasonably safe condition.20 4 The landlord was
deemed to have knowledge of a toilet seat's unsafe condition. 0 5 He
therefore had a duty to see that the unsafe condition was
remedied. 0
However, in MacCoy v. Colony House Builders, Inc., the general
contractor was not liable for the negligent installation of electrical
service which resulted in a fire. 20 The court said the general con-
tractor had no power to control the electrician's work.208 Therefore,
the electrician was an independent contractor, and his negligence
could not be imputed under the doctrine of respondeat superior.20
9
A trial court in Virginia rejected an effort to impose dram shop
liability on a proprietor of a bar in Lucas v. C & B Associates.1
202. Id. at 84, 380 S.E.2d at 636 (Russell, J., concurring).
203. Love v. Schmidt, 239 Va. 357, 389 S.E.2d 707 (1990); MacCoy v. Colony House
Builders, 239 Va. 64, 387 S.E.2d 760 (1990).
204. 239 Va. 357, 389 S.E.2d 707 (1990).
205. Id. at 361, 389 S.E.2d at 710. Notice of the broken toilet seat was given to the inde-
pendent contractor managing the defendant's property. The court imputed notice to the
defendant "on agency principles and the doctrine of respondeat superior." Id. Other recent
cases involving premises liability include Runyon v. Geldner, 237 Va. 460, 377 S.E.2d 456
(1989) (steep incline of driveway was open and obvious danger); FAD Ltd. Partnership v.
Feagley, 237 Va. 413, 377 S.E.2d 437 (1989) (landlord has reasonable time after storm to
remove ice from area).
206. Love, 239 Va. at 361, 389 S.E.2d at 710.
207. 239 Va. 64, 387 S.E.2d 760 (1990).
208. Id. at 68-69, 387 S.E.2d at 762. Unlike the independent contractor in Love, the inde-
pendent contractor's negligence in this case caused the injury in question. Id. at 67, 387
S.E.2d at 761.
209. The supreme court noted an exception to the rule that one who employs an indepen-
dent contractor is not liable for the injuries to third parties as a result of the independent
contractor's negligence. The "wrongful per se" exception allows a third party to recover
under the respondeat superior doctrine "only where the work to be performed is unlawful."
MacCoy, 239 Va. at 70, 387 S.E.2d at 763 (emphasis added). In MacCoy, the work to be
performed was lawful in itself, although the electrician violated the building code in the
course of performing the lawful work. Thus, the wrongful per se exception did not apply. Id.
210. 18 Va. Cir. 446 (Roanoke 1990).
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The clear rule in Virginia is that a dram shop owner cannot be
liable for failing to stop an intoxicated person who leaves the
premises and later causes injury to a third person. 1' The plaintiff
in Lucas attempted to escape the general rule on the grounds that
an employee knew the patron was intoxicated, was given the pa-
tron's keys to prevent him from driving, but nevertheless allowed
the patron to drive away."' The trial court said the employee
"simply had no right or duty to withhold [the patron's] keys."21 3
L. Damages
1. Compensatory Damages
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certi-
fied to the Supreme Court of Virginia several novel issues of Vir-
ginia law in Bulala v. Boyd.2 14 The supreme court refused to recog-
nize a separate compensable injury of "loss of enjoyment of life."2 5
Moreover, the court refused to permit recovery for loss of earning
capacity in the case of an infant with no work history. 16
Regarding "loss of enjoyment of life," the court said "the term is
duplicative of other elements" recognized in Virginia.21 7 Relying on
a New York case, the court noted further that suffering encom-
passes mental anguish, thus no "salutary purpose would be served
by having the jury make separate awards for pain and suffering
and loss of enjoyment of life. 21s
The court also held that recovery for lost future earnings must
be based on more than statistical averages.21 9 The female infant in
211. See Williamson v. The Old Brogue, Inc., 232 Va. 350, 350 S.E.2d 621 (1986).
212. Lucas, 18 Va. Cir. at 448.
213. Id. The court noted that, had the employee held the keys, he would have been liable
to the patron under a conversion theory. Id.; cf. Starr v. Ebbesen, 18 Va. Cir. 267 (Fairfax
County 1989) (holding parents liable for negligent entrustment of air rifle to a minor child,
analogizing to automobile entrustment cases).
214. 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
For purposes of this article, only those topics of general application to professional mal-
practice cases will be discussed. See generally Friend, Evidence: Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 613 (1990); Kaine, Professional Responsibility: Annual Survey of
Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 715 (1990); Mellette, Medical Malpractice and Health
Care Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 655 (1990); Charitable Im-
munity, supra note 4.
215. Bulala, 239 Va. at 232, 389, S.E.2d at 677.
216. Id. at 234, 389 S.E.2d at 678.
217. Id. at 232, 389 S.E.2d at 677.
218. Id. (quoting McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 257, 536 N.E.2d 372, 377 (1989)).
219. Id. at 233, 389 S.E.2d at 678.
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Bulala was born with serious birth defects as a result of the de-
fendant's malpractice. The infant died at age three.220 The plain-
tiffs' expert economist testified about median income of women in
metropolitan areas of Virginia, work life statistics and factors such
as mortality, age, race, and sex.22' The court held that this evi-
dence was insufficient to support a recovery for lost future earnings
because the evidence was not grounded upon facts "specific to the
individual whose loss is being calculated.' 222 Recognizing the diffi-
culty with such a rule where a person has no work history, the
court nevertheless stated, "Undoubtedly, such an evidentiary stan-
dard may confront a plaintiff having no work history and no pros-
pect of future earning ability with an impossible burden but we
think that result preferable to the unwarranted burden-shifting
that occurs when future earnings are projected solely on the basis
of statistics. 22
3
However, in Clark v. Chapman,224 the court upheld the admissi-
bility of expert testimony on lost wages although the plaintiff did
not have a substantial work history. "[I]n light of the items on
which [the expert] stated his calculations were based, . . . there
was sufficient evidence to support the expert testimony. '25
The plaintiff in Mastin v. Theirung,22' appealed a jury verdict
in her favor as "inadequate as a matter of law." The written jury
verdict stated "[i]n favor of the plaintiff sum of damages $0.00. '' 227
The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff failed to introduce
sufficient evidence requiring the jury to award damages. 228
The evidence in Mastin showed that the plaintiff had an unusu-
ally severe reaction to a minor automobile accident. The evidence
of her injuries was inconsistent . 2  The trial court admitted evi-
dence of the plaintiff's alcoholism and its likely effect on her reac-
220. Id. at 220, 389 S.E.2d at 672.
221. Id. at 232, 389 S.E.2d at 677.
222. Id. at 233, 389 S.E.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. 238 Va. 655, 385 S.E.2d 885 (1989).
225. Id. at 665, 385 S.E.2d 891. Justice Russell;joined by Chief Justice Carrico, dissented.
"The economist was permitted to extrapolate that minimal work history into a lifetime wage
loss using an elaborate construction of smoke and mirrors." Id. at 668-69, 385 S.E.2d at 893
(Russell, J. dissenting).
226. 238 Va. 434, 384 S.E.2d 86 (1989).
227. Id. at 436, 384 S.E.2d at 87.
228. Id. at 437, 384 S.E.2d at 88.
229. Id. at 437-38, 384 S.E.2d at 88.
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tion to the accident."' The supreme court ruled that the
defendant
might have been responsible for [plaintiff's] unusual reaction to a
minor trauma if the jury had concluded that the collision caused
that reaction. . . . [But] the jury could also have concluded that it
was equally likely that [plaintiff's] difficulties either arose from
some other cause unrelated to the trauma of the collision or were
feigned."'
2. Punitive Damages
The trial court's decision to set aside the jury's verdict awarding
compensatory damages was affirmed in Murray v. Hadid.232 Since
punitive damages must be predicated upon an award of compensa-
tory damages, the court necessarily denied the punitive damages
award.233
M. Defenses and Bars to Recovery
1. Contributory Negligence
The plaintiff in Love v. Schmidt,23 4 was injured when she fell off
a toilet seat she knew was loose. The trial court set aside the ver-
dict on the ground that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence caused her injury.2 35 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed, finding that reasonable minds could differ as to the
230. Id. at 440-41, 384 S.E.2d at 89.
231. Id. at 438-39, 384 S.E.2d at 88-89. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
And if you believe from the evidence that a particular injury complained of by the
plaintiff may have resulted from either of two causes, for one of which the defendant
might have been responsible, and for the other of which he was not, and if the jury
are unable to determine which of the two causes occasioned the injury complained of,
then the plaintiff cannot recover therefor.
Id. at 439, 384 S.E.2d at 89.
232. 238 Va. 722, 385 S.E.2d 898 (1989).
233. Id.; see Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 955 n.20 (E.D. Va. 1989)(punitive
damages in legal malpractice denied for lack of evidence of "willful, wanton, reckless, or
outrageous conduct"); see also Welch v. Jarman, 18 Va. Cir. 179 (Fairfax County 1989) (alle-
gation of legal intoxication, without more, is insufficient for punitive damages claim against
defendant driver, relying on Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 374 S.E.2d 1 (1988)); Tebbs v.
Kilgus, 17 Va. Cir. 214 (Northumberland County 1989) (punitive damages not recoverable
after death of tort-feasor since such damages are not to compensate, but to punish).
234. 239 Va. 357, 389 S.E.2d 707 (1990), reu'g 15 Va. Cir. 246 (Richmond 1989).
235. Id. at 359, 389 S.E.2d at 708.
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plaintiff's negligence since the toilet seat appeared to her to be
properly positioned on the toilet.23
The supreme court affirmed a trial court's decision to set aside a
$1.5 million verdict in Kelly v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.237
The trial court found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.23 s The plaintiff, a painter, attempted to move a fully
extended aluminum ladder along the side of a building where he
was painting gutters.23 9 The ladder contacted an uninsulated high-
voltage power line, resulting in severe injuries to the plaintiff.240
Although the plaintiff thought the wires above his ladder were
overhead telephone lines, the supreme court found that several
factors supported the trial court's ruling. The plaintiff was of aver-
age intelligence, was wary of power lines in his work, knew that
fiberglass ladders were available for use around power lines, and
knew that he should lower a ladder before moving it.241 In addi-
tion, the plaintiff recklessly failed to exercise due care to deter-
mine whether the lines were in fact dangerous.242
The supreme court rejected the use of a contributory negligence
instruction in Clark v. Chapman.243 There, the plaintiff, a business
invitee, was injured when a grocery store employee pushed a large
food rack into the plaintiff's hand.244 The plaintiff saw the rack
emerging from the storeroom twenty-seven feet away. However,
this movement did not create an open and obvious danger against
which the plaintiff had a duty to guard.2 43
The plaintiff in Cofield v. Nuckles,246 was injured when he at-
tempted to walk across a busy street. The crosswalk was blocked
by stopped traffic and the plaintiff proceeded to work his way
across the street.247 He found an opening in front of a van. The
van's driver, Hurdle, motioned the plaintiff across the final lane.248
236. Id. at 360, 389 S.E.2d at 709.
237. 238 Va. 32, 381 S.E.2d at 219 (1989).
238. Id. at 34, 381 S.E.2d at 222.
239. Id. at 37, 381 S.E.2d 221.
240. Id. at 34, 381 S.E.2d 220.
241. Id. at 38-40, 381 S.E.2d at 222-23.
242. Id. at 41, 381 S.E.2d at 223-24.
243. 238 Va. 655, 385 S.E.2d 885 (1989).
244. Id. at 657-58, 385 S.E.2d at 886-87.
245. Id. at 667-68, 385 S.E.2d at 887.
246. 239 Va. 186, 387 S.E.2d 493 (1990).
247. Id. at 188, 387 S.E.2d at 494.
248. Id.
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When the plaintiff stepped beyond Hurdle's van, he was struck by
Cofield's vehicle. 49
The supreme court held that the plaintiff was not contributori-
ally negligent as a matter of law. 50 The traffic prevented him from
crossing at the intersection, he was motioned across by Hurdle,
and he slowed his gait and looked for approaching traffic.2 ' More-
over, the plaintiff stepped from a position where he could be seen
by approaching traffic.25 2 It was for the jury to decide whether the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.5
2. Sudden Emergency and Unavoidable Accident
In Chodorov v. Eley,2 s4 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding "sudden
emergency" and "unavoidable accident." In Chodorov, the defend-
ant was blinded by the sun when his vehicle emerged from a tun-
nel, causing him to collide with vehicles that had stopped ahead of
him.255 Under these circumstances, the trial court erred in giving
the "sudden emergency" instruction because there was no "sud-
den, unexpected, and unforseen occurrence or happening that
call[ed] for immediate action. '25 Applying the rationale in another
recent case, the supreme court said "[n]o reasonable inferences
could be drawn. . . to suggest an 'emergency' within the meaning
of the sudden emergency doctrine. [The defendant] was following
one of a number of cars in a line of traffic and should have foreseen
that the car in front of him might stop suddenly. "251
249. Id.
250. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-923 (Repl. Vol. 1989) provides as follows: "When crossing
highways or streets, pedestrians shall not carelessly or maliciously interfere with the orderly
passage of vehicles. They shall cross, wherever possible, only at intersections or marked
crosswalks." VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-924 provides, "No pedestrian shall enter an intersection
in disregard of approaching traffic." VA. CODE ANN. 46.2-926 provides "No pedestrian shall
step into a highway open to moving vehicular traffic at any point between intersections
where their presence would be obscured from the vision of drivers of approaching vehicles
by a vehicle or other obstruction. .. ."
251. Cofield, 239 Va. at 189, 387 S.E.2d at 495.
252. Id. at 190, 387 S.E.2d at 495.
253. Id. at 191, 387 S.E.2d at 495 ("evidence presented a proper jury question").
254. 239 Va. 528, 391 S.E.2d 68 (1990).
255. Id. at 530, 391 S.E.2d at 69.
253. Id. at 530, 391 S.E.2d at 70.
257. Id. at 531, 391 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 86, 387 S.E.2d
473, 476 (1990)). The court emphasized in Garnot, that immediate and sudden stopping of
the vehicles in front of a driver is not enough to warrant an instruction on sudden emer-
gency. Such stopping is a foreseeable, expected occurrence. Id. at 530-31, 391 S.E.2d at 70.
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Regarding the "unavoidable accident" instruction, the supreme
court said that it is rarely permissible to give such an instruction
in automobile cases. 258 "Unavoidable accident" means "an accident
which ordinary care and diligence could not have prevented. '259
The evidence in the case showed that the driver of the vehicle im-
mediately in front of the defendant's vehicle had no trouble seeing
the stopped traffic approximately 100 feet ahead of him. The court
concluded that this evidence negated any possibility that the acci-
dent was one which ordinary care and diligence could not have
prevented.28 0
3. Illegal Actions
The plaintiffs' illegal acts barred their recovery in Murray v.
Hadid.26' There, the plaintiffs acted as unlicensed real estate bro-
kers in negotiating the sale of property in violation of licensing
laws.262 They were thus barred from recovery for the value of their
services."'
The plaintiff in Zysk v. Zysk,264 was barred from recovery for
personal injuries which resulted in her participation in the crime of
fornication. The plaintiff contracted Herpes Simplex Type-II virus
when she engaged in consensual sexual relations with her future
husband.26 5 She sued her husband for damages arising out of his
intentional and negligent conduct.266 The supreme court said that
"courts will not assist the participant in an illegal act who seeks to
profit from the act's commission. "267
258. Id. at 531, 391 S.E.2d at 70.
259. Id. (quoting Smith v. Tatum, 199 Va. 85, 91, 97 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1957)).
260. Id. at 532, 391 S.E.2d at 70. The Chodorov trial court correctly refused an instrc-
tion which stated: "The defendant ... has testified that he received a traffic summons for
following too closely and that he paid a forfeiture of said summons. You may corsider this
an admission of negligence on his part." Id. The supreme court did not say that such an
instruction is improper as a matter of law. Rather, the evidence did not support uch an
instruction because the defendant testified that he paid the fine to avoid the inconvenience
and expense of contesting the charge. Id. at 532, 391 S.E.2d at 70-71.
261. 238 Va. 722, 385 S.E.2d 898 (1989).
262. Id. at 729, 385 S.E.2d at 903.
263. Id.; cf. Erwin v. T.E.M., Inc., 17 Va. Cir. 376 (Va. Beach 1989) (person who ignites
illegal fireworks is negligent per se and is barred from recovery for injuries caused by
fireworks).
264. 239 Va. 32, 387 S.E.2d 466 (1990).
265. Id. at 33, 387 S.E.2d at 466.
266. Id. at 34, 387 S.E.2d at 467.
267. Id. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Repl. Vol. 1988) provides that "[a]ny person, not being
married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty
[Vol. 24:793824
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4. Sovereign Immunity
The sovereign immunity doctrine applied to a salaried employee
of a state hospital who worked as a fellow in a research and train-
ing program in Garguilo v. Ohar.2 6s The Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected the plaintiff's invitation to abolish sovereign immunity. 2 9
Considering the "multitude of purposes" served by the doctrine, 270
the court instead applied the traditional four-part test to find
immunity. 7
1
The court concluded that the nature of the function performed
by the defendant was to assist as an employee and student in basic
medical research programs. 72 The Commonwealth had an acute
interest in training and maintaining such a pool of specialists. 73
Moreover, the defendant, as a fellow, was vested with discretion
and judgment with respect to her patients who volunteered for her
program.2 Finally, the defendant was under the direct supervision
of superiors employed by the Commonwealth. Therefore, sovereign
immunity barred the plaintiff's claim.
5. Charitable Immunity27 6
Ordinarily, charitable institutions are immune from liability
from claims asserted by beneficiaries of the charity. This immu-
nity, however, did not apply in Thrasher v. Winand.17 In
Thrasher, the plaintiff participated in a festival by staffing a booth
of fornication, punishable as a Class 4 misdemeanor."
268. 239 Va. 209, 387 S.E.2d 787 (1990).
269. Id. at 212, 387 S.E.2d at 789.
270. Id. (quoting Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 308, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984)).
271. Id. (citing James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980)). The four parts of the
test are 1) the employee's function, 2) the extent of the state's interest and involvement, 3)
whether the function involves judgment and discretion, and 4) the degree of control the
state exercises over this function of the employee. James, 221 Va. at 53, 282 S.E.2d at 869.
272. Garguilo, 239 Va. at 213, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 213-14, 387 S.E.2d at 790.
275. Id. at 214, 387 S.E.2d at 790-91. Justice Stephenson, joined by Justice Compton,
dissented on the ground that the defendant was a licensed physician who developed a clear
physician-patient relationship with the plaintiff. "The majority . . . places too much em-
phasis on the relationship that existed between Dr. Ohar and the hospital and too little
emphasis on the relationship that existed between Dr. Ohar and her patient." Id. at 217, 387
S.E.2d at 792 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
276. See Charitable Immunity, supra note 4.
277. 239 Va. 338, 389 S.E.2d 699 (1990).
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sponsored by his social club.2 7s A share of the club's receipts went
to the charity organizer of the festival.279 In no way did the social
club, or vicariously the plaintiff, benefit from the works of the
charity organizer. Thus, the defendant's charitable immunity plea
was improperly sustained. 80
278. Id. at 340, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
279. Id. at 339, 389 S.E.2d at 700.
280. Id. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701. Plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident presuma-
bly caused by the placement of barricades around the festival site. Id. at 340, 389 S.E.2d at
700; see also Infant C. v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. 239 Va. 572, 391 S.E.2d 322 (1990). In
Infant C, the court noted the well-established exception to the charitable immunity doc-
trine. "[A] charitable organization is liable to the beneficiaries of the charity for the negli-
gence of its employees if [the charity] fails to exercise ordinary care in the selection and
retention of those employees." Id. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 325. The decision in Infant C.,
however, did not turn on this exception. See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text.
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